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Abstract 
Even though human social behavior has received considerable scientific attention in the last decades, its 
cognitive underpinnings are still poorly understood. Applying a dual-process framework to the study of social 
preferences, we show in two studies that individuals with a more reflective/deliberative cognitive style, as 
measured by scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), are more likely to make choices consistent with 
“mild” altruism in simple non-strategic decisions. Such choices increase social welfare by increasing the other 
person’s payoff at very low or no cost for the individual. The choices of less reflective individuals (i.e. those 
who rely more heavily on intuition), on the other hand, are more likely to be associated with either egalitarian 
or spiteful motives. We also identify a negative link between reflection and choices characterized by “strong” 
altruism, but this result holds only in Study 2. Moreover, we provide evidence that the relationship between 
social preferences and CRT scores is not driven by general intelligence. We discuss how our results can 
reconcile some previous conflicting findings on the cognitive basis of social behavior. 
 
Keywords: dual-process; reflection; intuition; social preferences; altruism; spitefulness; prosocial behavior; 
antisocial behavior; inequality aversion 
 
Introduction 
Mounting evidence shows that humans cooperate with non-kin even when doing so implies 
paying irrecoverable costs (Ledyard 1995, Gintis 2000, Henrich et al. 2001, Fehr & Gächter 
2002, Bowles & Gintis 2003, Camerer 2003). These prosocial behaviors are inconsistent with the 
strict pursue of self-interest and thus constitute a challenge for disciplines ranging from 
evolutionary biology to the social and behavioral sciences (Nowak 2006, Fehr & Camerer 2007, 
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Harbaugh et al. 2007, Perc & Szolnoki 2008, Roca et al. 2009, Capraro 2013, Exadaktylos et al. 
2013, Rand & Nowak 2013, Gutiérrez-Roig et al. 2014, Raihani 2014).  
 
In recent years, the cognitive underpinnings of social behavior have been increasingly studied, as 
their understanding is key for building a comprehensive account of the proximate—and, 
indirectly, also ultimate—explanations of human sociality (Stevens & Hauser 2004, Rand & 
Nowak 2013, Zaki & Mitchell 2013). Much of the advances on this front have been made within 
the framework of dual-process theories, which point to the existence of an interaction between 
fast, automatic/intuitive (“System 1”) and slow, controlled/reflective (“System 2”) decision 
making processes (Hogarth 2001, Stanovich 2010, Kahneman 2011). From this perspective, most 
research has focused on answering the question of whether human prosocial (as opposed to 
selfish) behavior is the result of intuition or reflection (Loewenstein & O’Donoghue 2004, 
Moore & Loewenstein 2004, Rand et al. 2012, Zaki & Mitchell 2013). In other words, are 
humans’ automatic responses selfish or prosocial?  
 
An extensive research program on the topic has identified cooperation as the intuitive response in 
anonymous one-shot social dilemma experiments, with further reflection leading to more selfish 
choices (Rand et al. 2012, 2014a, 2014b, Cone & Rand 2014, Evans et al. 2014, Rand & Kraft-
Todd 2014). These findings have led to the Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH; Rand et al. 
2014b), according to which people internalize social behaviors that generate personal benefits in 
daily life. In contrast to most economic experiments, daily life interactions are often repeated and 
face-to-face, and this implies that behaving cooperatively may be rewarding in the long run 
(through reciprocity, reputation or due to the existence of sanctions; Hamilton 1964, Williams 
1966, Trivers 1971, Fudenberg & Maskin 1986, Bowles & Gintis 2003). Individuals interacting 
in environments where helping others usually pays off would thus be more likely to internalize 
prosocial behaviors than individuals dwelling more “inhospitable” environments (Rand et al. 
2012, Peysakhovich & Rand 2015). Such internalization would lead people to apply prosocial 
heuristics even in situations where cooperation is maladaptive, such as in one-shot anonymous 
economic experiments.  
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Even though the SHH has received considerable empirical support (Roch et al. 2000, Cornelissen 
et al. 2011, Rand et al. 2012, 2014a, 2014b, Lotito et al. 2013, Cone & Rand 2014, Evans et al. 
2014, Nielsen et al. 2014, Rand & Kraft-Todd 2014, Schultz et al. 2014), a number of findings 
seem inconsistent with the idea of spontaneous prosociality and calculated selfishness (e.g. 
Knoch et al. 2006, 2010, DeWall et al. 2008, Piovesan & Wengström 2009, Martinsson et al. 
2012, 2014, Tinghog et al. 2013, Crockett et al. 2014, Jaber-López et al. 2014, Verkoeijen & 
Bouwmeester 2014).1 In this paper, we shall argue that our understanding of the sources of these 
apparent contradictions may benefit from an in-depth analysis of the motivations underlying 
social behavior. A distinction should thus be made between observed behavioral outcomes and 
underlying social motivations (Falk et al. 2005, Jensen 2010, Espín et al. 2012, Brañas-Garza et 
al. 2014,). Indeed, a variety of “prosocial” motivations (e.g. altruism or egalitarianism; see 
below) can trigger seemingly identical prosocial behaviors. It might be the case that some of the 
prosocial motivations that account for a specific behavior are linked to intuition whereas others 
are linked to reflection. This may explain why the analysis of isolated social decisions has led to 
mixed findings regarding the role of intuitive and reflective processes in prosocial behavior. Our 
main argument is that identifying the precise driving forces underlying a given social behavior is 
a first and necessary step toward understanding its cognitive underpinnings. 
 
The previous discussion focused on the often-studied prosocial side of human behavior but it 
nonetheless extends to the less-studied antisocial side. Evidence from economic experiments also 
shows that people often make “antisocial” decisions that reduce others’ welfare without any 
apparent personal gain (Zizzo & Oswald 2001, Fehr & Gächter 2002, Knoch et al. 2006, 
Herrman & Orzen 2008, Herrmann et al. 2008, Abbink et al. 2010, Espín et al. 2012, Kimbrough 
& Reiss 2012, Brañas-Garza et al. 2014). Spiteful behaviors that harm others even at one’s own 
cost may yet be advantageous, for example, in social environments where survival hinges upon 
one’s relative standing in the group.2 Therefore, following the SHH argument, some people 
might internalize behaviors that not only promote but also reduce others’ welfare as an 
adaptation to their daily life interactions. Welfare-reducing behaviors are likely to respond to 
                                            
1 See the General Discussion section for a more detailed overview of some of these findings. 
2 This may be the case, e.g., when there exist high levels of environmental uncertainty/volatility (e.g. violence) or 
when local (vs. global) competition for resources prevails (Gardner & West 2004, McCullough et al. 2013, 
Sylwester et al. 2013, Prediger et al. 2014).  
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antisocial motives that aim at increasing one’s relative standing (Kirchsteiger 1994, Van Lange 
1999, Charness & Rabin 2002, Jensen 2012). This logic has been applied, for instance, to 
understanding the punishment decisions of non-cooperators in social dilemma games (Shinada et 
al. 2004, Falk et al. 2005, Gächter & Herrmann 2011, Espín et al. 2012). When the punishing 
individual is a cooperator, however, fairness-based explanations are often put forward (Fehr & 
Schmidt 1999, Fehr & Gächter 2002, Gächter & Herrmann 2009, Espín et al. 2012). From this 
viewpoint, fairness concerns, which are traditionally considered to be prosocial (Van Lange 
1999), can also lead to behaviors that reduce the payoff of another individual. 
 
To analyze the cognitive underpinnings of human social interaction, it is thus important to 
distinguish people’s actual behaviors and motivations. To do so, it is necessary to bring back the 
too-often ignored antisocial motivations at the center of the debate. 
 
Disentangling social motives 
Research on social (other-regarding) preferences has developed theoretical models aimed at 
explaining, at the proximate level, non-selfish behaviors observed in one-shot economic 
experiments, such as cooperation in social dilemmas or the rejection of “unfair” offers in 
bargaining games (Rabin 1993, Kirchsteiger 1994, Levine 1998, Fehr & Schmidt 1999, Bolton & 
Ockenfels 2000, Charness & Rabin 2002, Falk & Fischbacher 2006, Cox et al. 2007, López-
Pérez 2008). Social preferences models can be grouped into three broad classes (Fehr & Schmidt 
2006): intentions-based (e.g. Rabin 1993), type-based (e.g. Levine 1998) and outcome-based 
(e.g. Fehr & Schmidt 1999) preferences. In this paper, we will focus on “outcome-based”—or 
distributional—social preferences which introduce the payoffs of relevant others into the 
individuals’ utility functions. In other words, individuals with outcome-based social preferences 
behave as if they were maximizing a utility function which includes a concern for the payoff of 
others, in addition to their own payoff. Models of social preferences constitute a potent tool to 
systematically characterize the motivations behind individuals’ decisions in social 
environments.3 
                                            
3 Note that we are using preference types as a classification device, irrespective of whether or not these are 
completely stable characteristics of individuals as often assumed in the social preferences literature. Indeed a 
number of studies challenge such interpretation and suggest that social preferences can be modulated/manipulated 
(e.g. Rand et al. 2012, McCall et al. 2014). 
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From a theoretical standpoint, we will base our analyses on the inequality-aversion model of 
Fehr & Schmidt (1999), which accounts for a potential asymmetry between advantageous and 
disadvantageous payoff comparisons between the self and a referent other (e.g. Loewenstein et 
al. 1989). We extend the previous model so as to capture behaviors than may not strictly follow 
from the standard inequality-aversion model. We will rely on a generalized and flexible 
specification of preferences that will allow us to disentangle competing explanations of 
individuals’ decisions, including both prosocial and antisocial motivations. Similar approaches 
have been followed for instance by Charness & Rabin (2002), Engelmann & Strobel (2004), 
Engelmann (2012) and Cox (2013). 
According to the basic specification of the model (Fehr & Schmidt 1999), the utility derived by 
individual i from the payoff vector X=(x1, …, xn) is given by: 
Ui(X) = xi - αi ∑
≠− ijn
 ,0}x -{xmax 
1
1
ij - βi ∑
≠− ijn
 ,0}x -{xmax 
1
1
ji ,   (1) 
where the parameters αi and βi refer to the individual i’s aversion to disadvantageous (i.e. 
“envy”) and advantageous inequality (i.e. “compassion”), respectively. Thus, a self-regarding 
individual who is indifferent to others’ payoffs would exhibit αi = βi = 0. A person with other-
regarding motives would prefer either to increase or decrease others’ payoffs depending on the 
sign and value of αi [βi] if others’ payoffs are above [below] her own payoffs.  
 
One caveat in the categorization of social behavior is that individuals’ decisions in standard 
economic games are typically consistent with different types of motivations. For instance, both 
spiteful and selfish motives would identically lead to zero transfers in dictator games (Brañas-
Garza et al. 2014). Similarly, the acceptance of a low offer in the ultimatum game could result 
from either selfishness or altruism (Staffiero et al. 2013). In order to uncover the driving forces 
behind a particular decision, a clear cut procedure is to observe the decisions made by the same 
individual in different social situations (Falk et al. 2005, Espín et al. 2012, Yamagishi et al. 2012, 
Staffiero et al. 2013, Brañas-Garza et al. 2014, Peysakhovich et al. 2014). In addition, these 
decisions should be free of strategic or reciprocal concerns since these could alter behavior and 
distort the assessment of outcome-based preferences (Charness & Rabin 2002). To infer the 
social motives underlying choices we will study a series of two-player allocation decisions for 
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which an individual decides how to allocate different amounts of money between herself and a 
passive recipient. In our two-person case, the model presented in Eq. (1) is reduced to: 
Ui(xi, xj) = xi - αi max{xj – xi, 0} - βi max{xi – xj, 0}.    (2) 
 
In its original formulation, Fehr & Schmidt (1999) assume αi ≥ βi ≥ 0, which means that 
individuals can be either egalitarian (αi ≥ 0 and βi ≥ 0; with at least one inequality being strict) or 
selfish (αi = βi = 0). This parameterization also implies that people are assumed to display at least 
as envy as compassion (αi ≥ βi). We do not impose these restrictions on the model parameters so 
that individuals’ motivations can be characterized as follows:  
(i) Self-interest if individuals’ decisions maximize their own payoff (αi = 0 and βi = 0); 
(ii) Altruism if individuals’ decisions maximize the other’s payoff (αi ≤ 0 and βi ≥ 0; with at least 
one inequality being strict)—a concern for social welfare also applies if, in addition, |αi|, |βi| < 
0.5 (Engelmann 2012)4—;  
(iii) Egalitarianism if individuals’ decisions minimize payoff inequality (αi ≥ 0 and βi ≥ 0; with 
at least one inequality being strict);  
(iv) Spitefulness if individuals’ decisions minimize the other’s payoff (αi ≥ 0 and βi ≤ 0; with at 
least one inequality being strict)—which, for empirically relevant values of αi and βi, also implies 
a preference for increasing the individual’s relative standing. 
(v) Inequality-seeking if individuals’ decisions maximize payoff inequality (αi ≤ 0 and βi ≤ 0; 
with at least one inequality being strict)—note that we include this type of preferences for the 
sake of completeness even though few individuals typically fall into this category.  
 
Hence, we classify individuals’ motives according to the combination of both model parameters. 
Following previous literature, we shall consider that altruism and egalitarianism are prosocial 
preferences (e.g. Van Lange 1999, Fehr & Schmidt 2006) while spitefulness is antisocial (e.g. 
Herrmann & Orzen 2008, Jensen 2012, Brañas-Garza et al. 2014). 
 
To illustrate the relevance of the former categorization in understanding the cognitive basis of 
social behavior, we consider the example of social dilemma experiments which have served as 
                                            
4 Note that an individual with α ≤ -0.5 and β ≥ 0.5 would give money away even when doing so does not increase 
the total surplus (i.e. social welfare, also referred to as “efficiency”). 
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the basic empirical ground for the SHH. A social dilemma is a situation where the individual and 
the collective interests are in conflict (e.g. Dawes 1980, Van Lange et al. 2013). In the typical 
setup, individuals are matched in groups of size n and have to decide simultaneously whether to 
allocate their endowment to a group project (i.e. “cooperate”) or whether to keep it for 
themselves (i.e. “defect”). The resources allocated to the group project are multiplied by a 
synergy factor s and then shared evenly among the n group members, regardless of their 
individual contributions. The social dilemma arises when 1 < s < n, so that cooperation 
maximizes the total surplus of the group (i.e. social welfare, the collective interest) whereas 
defection maximizes individual payoff. However, in addition to maximizing one’s own payoff, 
defection also minimizes others’ payoff, so that defection can result either from self-interest or 
from antisocial, spiteful motives (Falk et al. 2005, Espín et al. 2012). On the other hand, 
cooperation increases others’ payoffs as well as social welfare and can thus result from altruistic 
motives, either with or without a concern for social welfare. Finally, depending on the level of 
cooperation one expects from the other group members, both defection and cooperation could 
also result from egalitarian motives. An individual whose goal is to reduce inequality would 
defect [cooperate] if she expects others to defect [cooperate]. The previous arguments highlight 
the difficulty to isolate the social motivations and cognitive underpinnings of people’s behavior 
in social dilemmas. For example, it is difficult to conclude whether reflective defection (e.g. 
Rand et al. 2012, 2014b) is driven by a desire to (i) maximize one’s own payoff (the 
interpretation advanced by the authors), (ii) reduce others’ payoffs or (iii) equalize payoffs with 
(expectedly) greedy partners. Defection in social dilemmas is thus consistent with selfish, 
antisocial, and even prosocial motivations. Similarly, it is difficult to disentangle whether 
intuitive cooperative responses are the result of a willingness to (i) increase others’ payoffs, 
irrespective of the cost, (ii) increase others’ payoffs only when the cost is sufficiently low so that 
social welfare increases or (iii) equalize payoffs with (expectedly) cooperative partners. The 
number of possible interpretations of people’s behavior in social dilemmas would increase even 
further if we considered reciprocal concerns (i.e. responding kindly to kind actions and unkindly 
to unkind actions, see e.g. Charness & Rabin 2002). Isolating the motivations of individual 
behavior presents similar challenges in most of the economic games which are used in the 
literature on the cognitive basis of social behavior such as standard dictator and ultimatum 
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games. To alleviate these concerns, our experimental design makes use of several decisions in 
short, cognitively undemanding and non-strategic tasks. 
 
A trait approach to cognitive reflection 
To isolate intuitive and reflective cognitive processes, previous behavioral research on social 
behavior has primarily relied on the analysis of reaction times (e.g. Rubinstein 2007, Piovesan & 
Wengström 2009, Brañas-Garza et al. 2012b, Rand et al. 2012, Lotito et al. 2013) and the use of 
experimental manipulations, such as cognitive load (e.g. Cornelissen et a. 2011, Duffy and Smith 
2014, Hauge et al. 2014, Schulz et al. 2014) or time pressure (e.g. Tinghog et al. 2013, Cone & 
Rand 2014, Rand et al. 2014a, 2014b, Rand & Kraft-Todd 2014). In this paper, we adopt a trait 
approach which relies on the assumption that individuals who have a more intuitive cognitive 
style are more likely to make decisions guided by automatic processes (System1), whereas more 
reflective individuals are more likely driven by deliberative processes (System 2) (Oechssler et 
al. 2009, Toplak et al. 2011, Peysakhovich & Rand 2015). Subjects’ cognitive styles are assessed 
through the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick 2005), which measures the ability to 
override intuitive responses and to engage in further reflection before making a decision. The 
CRT is a short task consisting of a set of insights problems (three in the original form of 
Frederick 2005, and seven in the extended version introduced by Toplak et al. 2014). The CRT 
differs from other measures of cognitive abilities as it is designed to prompt an intuitive, yet 
incorrect, answer to the respondent’s mind. To reach the correct answer, the person must 
override this automatic response by engaging in reflection.  
 
The CRT fits in nicely with the dual-process approach of decision making. The responses to the 
test are indeed a good proxy for the individuals’ tendency to make intuitive vs. reflective 
decisions. CRT scores have been found to predict one’s own ability to refrain from using 
inaccurate heuristics in a variety of situations (Oechssler et al. 2009, Toplak et al. 2011).5 
Furthermore, there is evidence that the same behaviors that are observed after experimental 
                                            
5 Also, the CRT has been found to correlate with one’s ability to delay gratification (Frederick, 2005, Bosch-
Domènech et al. 2014) and avoid distractions at work (Corgnet et al. 2014b). In addition, student performance in the 
CRT has been shown to correlate positively with earnings in experimental asset markets (Corgnet et al. 2014a) and 
other individual tasks involving the capacity to think backwards (Brañas-Garza et al. 2012a). Finally, the CRT has 
also been shown to correlate negatively with the adoption of paranormal beliefs (Pennycook et al. 2012, Shenhav et 
al. 2012). 
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manipulations of intuitive processing covary with CRT scores in the expected direction (e.g. 
Shenhav et al. 2012). With regards to social behavior, Peysakhovic & Rand (2015) show that an 
individual’s score on the CRT can predict her tendency to apply previously-acquired social 
heuristics in environments where they are not advantageous. The authors first conducted 
repeated social dilemmas where cooperation was or was not advantageous before embedding 
subjects in one-shot games (social dilemma, dictator and trust games) where prosocial behavior 
was detrimental to subjects’ payoff. As predicted by the SHH, subjects who had interacted in the 
environment where cooperation was advantageous were on average more prosocial in the 
subsequent one-shot games compared to those who had interacted in the environment were 
cooperation was disadvantageous. However, after separating subjects according to cognitive 
style, the authors show that the predicted spillover effect was only observed among subjects with 
low CRT scores. 
 
Our empirical strategy will be to correlate subjects’ answers to the extended version of the CRT 
(Toplak et al. 2014) with their decisions in a short, cognitively undemanding and non-strategic 
task aimed at eliciting the social motives underlying behavior. A similar approach has been 
undertaken in an independent study conducted by Cueva et al. (2015) and Ponti & Rodriguez-
Lara (2015). We present the results of two studies one of which was conducted in the US and the 
other in Spain.  
 
 
Study 1 
Methods 
Participants and general protocol. Participants were 150 students (44.67% female; mean age 
20.61±2.73 (SD)) from Chapman University in the U.S. These participants were recruited from a 
database of more than 2,000 students. A subset of the whole database received invitations at 
random for participating in the current study, which is part of a larger research program on 
cognitive abilities and economic decision making. The local IRB approved this research. All 
participants provided informed consent prior to participating. No deception was used. 
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We conducted a total of 12 sessions, nine of which with 12 participants and three of which with 
14 participants. On average, sessions lasted for 45 minutes. All subjects completed the same 
tasks in the same order. Importantly, since our aim is to study reflection as a cognitive style (i.e. 
the trait approach), the social preferences elicitation task was performed before the CRT. 
Otherwise, having completed the CRT could have induced a reflective mindset which might alter 
the relationship between trait reflectiveness and the behavior under study (Paxton et al. 2012). In 
any case, in between the social preferences elicitation task and the CRT participants completed a 
series of unrelated tasks for about 15 minutes and had a break of 10 minutes. This protocol 
alleviates concerns about the existence of between-tasks spillover effects (e.g. Fromell et al. 
2014) which may potentially induce reverse causality.  
 
Cognitive style assessment. We measured the participants’ tendency to rely on intuition vs. 
reflection using the Cognitive Reflection Test introduced by Frederick (2005). To the original 
CRT questions, we added four questions recently developed by Toplak et al. (2014). The full set 
of questions can be found in (supplementary) Text S1. In Table S1, we display the % of subjects 
answering each question correctly, split by gender. As expected, males performed better in the 
test than females (Frederick 2005, Bosch-Domènech et al. 2014). Our measure of cognitive 
reflection is given by the total number of correct answers (from 0 to 7). The full distribution of 
correct answers by males (mean = 3.67±2.25) and females (mean = 2.39±1.95) is provided in 
Figure S1. 
 
In addition to CRT, we also measured general intelligence which is likely to be a confounding 
factor of the (potential) relationship between CRT scores and social behavior. Because 
answering CRT questions require cognitive abilities, CRT scores partly capture general 
intelligence in addition to cognitive reflection (Frederick 2005, Stanovich 2009). However, 
cognitive reflection differs from intelligence as measured in standard IQ tests (e.g. Raven 
matrices). Intelligence tests measure one’s capacity to compute solutions to problems but fail to 
assess one’s capacity to engage in reflection (Stanovich 2009). Although basic cognitive abilities 
are required to answer the CRT correctly, an intelligent person may often rely on automatic 
answers (System 1) falling short of blocking intuitive processes by engaging in reflection 
(System 2). In order to evaluate the importance of general intelligence as a possible confound in 
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the relationship between CRT and social behavior, we measured subjects’ IQ using the Raven 
progressive matrices test (Raven 1941) and used it as a control variable in our analyses. 
Specifically, we used the odd number of the last three series of matrices (Jaeggi et al. 2010). The 
number of matrices correctly solved in the Raven test (in our sample, ranging from 8 to 18, mean 
= 14.61±2.12) is a conventional measure of cognitive ability. This test captures an important 
aspect of cognitive ability which is referred to as fluid intelligence or algorithmic thinking 
(Stanovich 2009, 2010).  
 
Consistently with Frederick (2005) and Stanovich (2009, 2010) we find moderate positive 
correlation between the number of correct answers in the CRT and Raven tests (r = 0.43, p < 
0.01) which suggests that CRT and Raven are not entirely measuring the same cognitive skills. 
As is standard practice, none of the cognitive tests were incentivized (Frederick 2005). 
 
Social preferences elicitation. We elicited social preferences à la Bartling et al. (2009) by asking 
participants to make four choices between two possible allocations of money between 
themselves and another anonymous participant with whom they were randomly matched. All 
participants made all the four decisions. We used this short task because it provides a good 
balance between (maximizing) the information that can be obtained and (minimizing) the 
cognitive effort required to complete the task. In each experimental session, two participants and 
one of the four decisions were selected at random for payment. The choice of the first participant 
in the selected decision was used to allocate payoffs between the two participants (e.g. 
Sheremeta and Shields 2013). All decisions were anonymous. 
 
The allocation decisions are described in Table 1. Option A always yielded an even distribution 
of money ($2 for both the self and the other participant), whereas option B yielded uneven 
payoffs. The first two decisions refer to the advantageous domain while the last two decisions 
refer to the disadvantageous domain. For each decision, we show in parentheses the 
envy/compassion parameter associated to choosing the egalitarian and non-egalitarian options 
(i.e. options A and B) and in square brackets the proportion of subjects who chose each option. 
In order to compute the model parameters, we assume that utility is linear over the range of 
payoffs involved in the task (Fehr & Schmidt 1999). 
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Decision # 
Option A 
self, other 
 Option B 
self, other 
 
1 $2,$2 (β ≥ 0) [86%] $2,$1 (β ≤ 0) [14%] 
2 $2,$2 (β ≥ 0.5) [23%] $3,$1 (β ≤ 0.5) [77%] 
3 $2,$2 (α ≥ 0) [42%] $2,$4 (α ≤ 0) [58%] 
4 $2,$2 (α ≥ 0.5) [31%] $3,$5 (α ≤ 0.5) [69%] 
Table 1. Decisions in the social preferences task (Study 1). For each option, we display the payoff 
for the decision-maker and the recipient, the associated model parameters (in parentheses) and the % 
of subjects choosing it (in square brackets). 
 
As it happens with nearly every single decision in social interactions, each choice is consistent 
with multiple social preferences. For instance, in Decision 1 the participants had to decide 
whether or not to increase the payoff of a worse-off counterpart by $1 at no cost—or, 
alternatively, whether or not to reduce the other’s payoff below one’s own by $1 at no cost. 
Choosing option A in Decision 1 implies β ≥ 0 (compassion) and thus it may, depending on the 
exact value of β and the sign of α, be consistent with either egalitarianism, altruism, social-
welfare concerns or self-interest (a selfish individual would choose randomly in this decision). 
Option B in Decision 1 is associated with β ≤ 0, which means that it can be chosen by individuals 
driven by either spitefulness or self-interest. Note that Decision 2 resembles the standard dictator 
game (Forsythe et al. 1994) in the sense that increasing the other’s payoff does not increase the 
total surplus, i.e. social welfare. On the other hand, Decisions 3 and 4 resemble the decision of a 
second player (responder) in the standard ultimatum game (Güth et al. 1982)—if we leave 
reciprocal concerns aside—who has to choose whether to reject (option A) or accept (option B) a 
disadvantageous split proposed by the first player (proposer).   
 
Results and discussion 
Decision analysis 
Columns (1a)-(4a) of Table 2 display a series of Probit models estimating the likelihood of 
choosing option B (i.e. the non-egalitarian choice) in each of the four decisions as a function of 
CRT scores, and controlling for gender. Columns (1b)-(4b) replicate the same regressions but 
using Raven scores, instead of CRT, as the main explanatory variable. Finally, in columns (1c)-
(4c) both CRT and Raven are included as regressors. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
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individual level are presented in parentheses. In Figure S3, we display the % of subjects 
choosing option B in each decision, broken down into two CRT groups, namely individuals with 
below-median (i.e. three or less correct answers, n = 86) and above-median (n = 64) scores. 
 
Decision 1 Decision 2 Decision 3 Decision 4 
Dep var: β ≤ 0 (vs ≥ 0) β ≤ 0.5 (vs ≥ 0.5) α ≤ 0 (vs ≥ 0) α ≤ 0.5 (vs ≥ 0.5) 
 
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) 
CRT -0.136** -0.054 0.249*** 0.236*** 
 
(0.065) (0.054) (0.055) (0.059) 
female -0.573* -0.329 -0.205 -0.219 
 
(0.306) (0.236) (0.224) (0.233) 
cons -0.465* 1.077*** -0.438* -0.070 
 
(0.278) (0.252) (0.230) (0.233) 
ll -57.017 -79.185 -88.038 -81.547 
Wald χ2 5.27* 2.43 23.72*** 19.25*** 
pseudo R2 0.061 0.014 0.137 0.126 
 
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) 
Raven -0.061 0.034 0.093* 0.121** 
 
(0.052) (0.055) (0.050) (0.050) 
female -0.438 -0.242 -0.468** -0.446** 
 
(0.273) (0.228) (0.211) (0.219) 
cons -0.024 0.373 -0.945 -1.051 
 
(0.852) (0.811) (0.745) (0.742) 
ll -58.909 -79.473 -97.676 -88.273 
Wald χ2 3.25 1.45 8.33** 9.50*** 
pseudo R2 0.030 0.010 0.043 0.054 
 
(1c) (2c) (3c) (4c) 
CRT -0.134* -0.090 0.253*** 0.221*** 
 
(0.075) (0.057) (0.061) (0.064) 
Raven -0.007 0.074 -0.009 0.036 
 
(0.070) (0.059) (0.055) (0.055) 
female -0.571* -0.361 -0.202 -0.233 
 
(0.309) (0.234) (0.226) (0.236) 
cons -0.376 0.131 -0.319 -0.540 
 
(0.936) (0.817) (0.734) (0.749) 
ll -57.012 -78.420 -88.026 -81.365 
Wald χ2 5.41 4.57 23.72*** 19.30*** 
pseudo R2 0.061 0.023 0.137 0.128 
Table 2. Non-egalitarian choice (option B) as a function of CRT and Raven (Study 1). Probit 
estimates. The α and β parameters associated with the dependent variable are displayed on top of each 
column. In “a” regressions, the main explanatory variable is CRT score. In “b” regressions, the main 
explanatory variable is Raven score. In “c” regressions, both CRT and Raven scores are included as 
explanatory variables. Robust standard errors clustered on individuals are shown in parentheses. *, **, 
*** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. N = 150 in all regressions.  
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From column (1a) of Table 2, we observe that the CRT score is negatively and significantly 
associated with the choice of option B in Decision 1 (p = 0.04), suggesting that more reflective 
subjects are less likely to reduce the counterpart’s payoff below their own payoff. In terms of the 
model parameters, subjects with higher CRTs are less likely to exhibit β ≤ 0. A two-sided 
binomial test rejects the hypothesis that above-median CRTs are indifferent between the two 
options in Decision 1 (i.e. 50% probability of choosing option B, p < 0.01), as would be the case 
for an individual motivated by self-interest (i.e. β = 0). For below-median CRTs, the binomial 
test yields a similar result (p < 0.01). Therefore, regardless of CRT, most subjects seem to exhibit 
strictly positive compassion (β > 0) (see Figure S3). 
 
However, in Decision 2, where increasing the other’s payoff is costly, CRT is no longer 
significant (p > 0.30, column 2a). This result suggests that the probability that the compassion 
parameter exceeds 0.5 does not differ across CRT scores. Additionally, within both the above-
median and below-median CRT groups, a two-sided binomial test rejects that subjects are 
indifferent between the two options (ps < 0.01). This suggests that, regardless of CRT, β ≠ 0.5. 
Indeed, for both above- and below-median CRTs, the % of subjects choosing option B is strictly 
above 50%, suggesting a median β strictly below 0.5 (see Figure S3). 
 
Taken together, the results of Decision 1 and 2 indicate that, whereas the majority of subjects 
exhibit β ϵ (0, 0.5), subjects with lower CRT scores are yet significantly more likely to exhibit β 
≤ 0. 
 
With respect to disadvantageous comparisons, column (3a) shows that CRT positively and 
significantly predicts choosing option B in Decision 3 (p < 0.01), which indicates that more 
reflective individuals are more likely to exhibit α ≤ 0. From Figure S3, we observe that this effect 
is strong, as nearly 80% of the subjects with above-median CRT decide not to lower their 
counterpart’s payoff (this is significantly different from 50%: two-sided binomial test, p < 0.01), 
while only about 42% of below-median CRTs do so (which is not significantly different from 
50%, p > 0.16). These results suggest that high-CRT individuals are not indifferent between both 
options in Decision 3—as would be the case for an individual motivated by self-interest, i.e. α = 
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0. In sum, high-CRT individuals are mostly characterized by α < 0, while the envy parameter that 
best characterizes low CRT individuals seems to be close to zero or even slightly positive.  
 
The results for Decision 4 are similar to those for Decision 3 as option B is positively and 
significantly predicted by CRT (p < 0.01, column 4a). This suggests that more reflective 
individuals are also more likely to exhibit α ≤ 0.5. Observing that more than 80% of the above-
median CRT subjects choose option B in Decision 4 (see Figure S3; this proportion is 
significantly different from 50%: two-sided binomial test, p < 0.01), we can conclude that the 
envy parameter that best describes high CRTs is strictly lower than 0.5. In the case of below-
median CRTs, however, this percentage falls to 58% (which is not significantly different from 
50%, p > 0.16). Following the results of Decisions 3 and 4, low-CRT subjects, on average, 
display values of α which are apparently higher than those of high-CRT subjects.  
 
Note that the qualitative nature of our statistical results does not depend on whether we use CRT 
scores or a binary categorization of CRT (as in Figure S3). Using above-median (vs. below-
median) CRT as a binary explanatory variable in the regression analysis instead of CRT scores 
yields similar results (see Table S3). The effect of CRT in Decision 1 is, however, no longer 
significant at standard levels (p = 0.21). 
 
Now, we turn to the second set of regressions of Table 2 (columns 1b-4b), where subjects’ 
choices are estimated as a function of Raven scores. For those decisions for which CRT was 
found to be a significant predictor (namely Decisions 1, 3 and 4), the effect of Raven is 
qualitatively similar to that of CRT, although the statistical significance is lower (even non-
significant in the case of Decision 1, p = 0.28). These results may indicate that a non-negligible 
share of the observed relationship between CRT and social preferences is actually driven by 
general intelligence. In order to address this point, we conducted a last series of regressions in 
which the scores on both cognitive measures are included as explanatory variables (columns 1c-
4c). The regression results point to the opposite direction: the effect of CRT remains statistically 
significant while the significance of Raven scores completely vanishes when both variables are 
included in the same model. Thus, it is CRT which drives the relationship between Raven and 
social preferences. As an indication of the strength of this effect, note that the coefficient 
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associated to Raven scores is reduced by more than 70% after controlling for CRT in the three 
aforementioned decisions. So, it seems that finding the correct solution in the Raven test involves 
some level of cognitive reflection, and it is this aspect which entirely explains the relationship 
between Raven scores and social preferences. Given that CRT accounts for virtually all the effect 
of Raven on social decisions, from now on, we concentrate on the analysis of CRT scores. 
 
Social preferences categorization 
According to the above results, the decisions of most high-CRT individuals can be characterized 
as non-envious, i.e. α < 0, and moderately compassionate, i.e. β ϵ (0, 0.5). Although the majority 
of low-CRT individuals seem to be moderately compassionate as well they differ from high-CRT 
individuals by being envious. In addition, individuals with lower CRT scores are also 
significantly more likely to exhibit a non-positive compassion parameter (β ≤ 0), which in 
combination with envy (α > 0) would be a sign of antisocial, spiteful motivations. As previously 
argued, combining both α and β is essential to obtain a complete picture of the motives driving 
social behavior. Our next analyses address this point. 
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Figure 1. Classification of subjects according to the envy and compassion parameters, by CRT groups (Study 
1). The figure displays the % of subjects that can be classified according to each combination of α and β and the 
social preferences which are consistent with each category, broken down into below-median (n = 85) and above-
median (n = 64) CRT score groups. 
 
Figure 1 displays the % of individuals who are classified according to all possible combinations 
of the α and β parameters. Note that we include only those subjects with consistent choices, that 
is, choices which lead to compatible estimates of both α and β. This procedure excludes only one 
subject (out of 150). The left and right panels refer to subjects with below- and above-median 
CRT scores. In the table below each 3D plot, we highlight which among the combinations of the 
α and β parameters are consistent with each of the six categories of social motives previously 
defined: altruism, social-welfare concerns, self-interest, egalitarianism, spitefulness and 
inequality-seeking. For instance, all the (α, β) categories that include the value of 0 for both 
parameters are consistent with self-interest. The four cells representing these categories are 
surrounded by a green line. Also, the two (α, β) categories that include negative values of α and 
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positive values of β are consistent with altruistic motives and are surrounded by a light blue line. 
As was suggested by the previous analyses, above-median CRTs are concentrated (55% of them) 
in the category “α ≤ 0, β ϵ [0, 0.5]”, which is highlighted in Figure 1. The proportion of above-
median CRT subjects belonging to this category is significantly larger than the proportion of 
above-median CRT subjects belonging to any other category (two-sided Normal Proportion tests, 
ps < 0.01). In the case of below-median CRT subjects a much lower proportion (29%) belong to 
the “α ≤ 0, β ϵ [0, 0.5]” category (two-sided Normal Proportion test, p < 0.01). This category is 
still the most populated category among below-median CRT individuals and the proportion of 
individuals belonging to this category is significantly larger than the proportion of below-median 
CRT individuals belonging to any other category (two-sided Normal Proportion tests, ps < 0.01) 
but the “α ≥ 0.5, β ϵ [0, 0.5]” category (p = 0.38).  
 
The category “α ≤ 0, β ϵ [0, 0.5]” is consistent with both self-interest and altruism and can thus 
be seen as “weak altruism”. Our choice of terminology is to refer as “weak” all the social 
preferences categories that are consistent with self-interest (i.e. α = 0 and β = 0). We refer to as 
“strong” all the (α, β) social preferences categories which are not “weak”. Note that the  “weak 
altruism” category is also the only category that is consistent with social-welfare motives. In 
order to show that these subjects display a preference for social welfare, however, one must 
show that -0.5 < α < 0 which cannot be demonstrated given the social preferences elicitation task 
used in this study. 
 
In order to inquire further on the categorization of social preferences and highlight differences 
across CRT scores, we perform a multinomial Probit regression (see Figure 2). We estimate the 
likelihood that an individual is included in the category “α ≤ 0, β ϵ [0, 0.5]”, as compared to each 
of the other eight categories. We include CRT scores and gender as regressors. In each cell 
representing an (α, β) category in Figure 2, we show the coefficient associated to CRT scores for 
the comparison of this specific (α, β) category with the default category (“α ≤ 0, β ϵ [0, 0.5]”), 
which is left empty. As expected, all the coefficients associated to CRT are negative, indicating 
that subjects with higher CRT scores are more likely to be included in the default category than 
in any of the other categories. These coefficients are highly significant (ps < 0.01) when 
comparing the default category with the following ones: “α ϵ [0, 0.5], β ≤ 0” (weakly spiteful), 
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“α ϵ [0, 0.5], β ϵ [0, 0.5]” (weakly egalitarian) and “α ≥ 0.5, β ≤ 0” (strongly spiteful). Marginal 
significance is also achieved when comparing the default option with the category “α ≥ 0.5, β ≥ 
0.5” (strongly egalitarian, p = 0.06). However, CRT scores are not statistically significant when 
comparing the default category with the remaining three categories (ps > 0.41):  “α ≤ 0, β ≥ 0.5” 
(strongly altruistic), “α ≤ 0, β ≤ 0” (weakly inequality seeking) and “α ϵ [0, 0.5], β ≥ 0.5” 
(strongly egalitarian). Yet, the latter two categories contain only six and four observations, 
respectively. Finally, the coefficients of these three categories (-0.030, -0.011 and -0.117, 
respectively) are the only ones which significantly differ from that of the strongly spiteful 
category “α ≥ 0.5, β ≤ 0” (p < 0.01, p < 0.01 and p = 0.06), which reports the highest coefficient 
in absolute value (-0.457). 
 
Figure 2. Output of multinomial Probit regression (Study 1). In each cell, the figure shows the coefficient of 
CRT obtained by comparing that specific social preference category with “α ≤ 0, β ϵ [0, 0.5]”. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. Ll = -247.017, Wald χ2 = 45.12 (p < 0.01), N = 149. 
Robust standard errors clustered on individuals are shown in parentheses, and the number of observations in square 
brackets. 
 
Our classification thus suggests that high cognitive reflection is characteristic of individuals with 
α ≤ 0 and β ϵ [0, 0.5], which corresponds to “weak” altruism, whereas less reflective individuals 
are more likely to be guided by either spiteful or egalitarian motives. Yet, our previous analysis 
of each of the four decisions in the social preferences elicitation task led to the more precise 
conclusion that high CRTs are characterized by α < 0 and β ϵ (0, 0.5). That is, high-CRT 
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individuals are unlikely to be purely selfish (α = 0, β = 0); instead they can be considered as 
mildly altruistic.  
 
Given the data of Study 1, high-CRT people are apparently more willing to give money to the 
other person than low-CRT people as long as it is not too costly for them to do so. Indeed, 
subjects with higher CRT scores are more willing to give money to the other person when it is 
costless (Decisions 1, 3 and 4) but not when it is very costly (Decision 2). Moreover, note that 
those subjects who give money to the other person in Decisions 1, 3 and 4 may respond to 
concerns for social welfare whereas such interpretation of giving is not valid for Decision 2. 
 
However, substantial differences may still exist in the levels of envy (α) and compassion (β) 
among those subjects characterized as mildly altruistic. Some mildly altruistic individuals may 
be close to selfishness (α ≈ 0, β ≈ 0) whereas others may not. Our data cannot separate these 
different types of subjects. To that end, we extend the social preferences elicitation task of 
Bartling et al. (2009). First, we include in our elicitation task a decision for which increasing the 
payoff of the other person above one’s own is personally costly. This decision will allow us to 
isolate subjects who are practically selfish (α ≈ 0) in the negative domain of envy. Second, 
among mildly altruistic subjects there may be individuals with social-welfare concerns (|αi|, |βi| < 
0.5). To isolate people who care about social welfare, we need that increasing the better-off 
counterpart’s payoff in the aforementioned decision also increases social welfare (i.e. the cost for 
the decision maker is lower than the increase in the other player’s payoff). In addition, we need 
to include another decision for which increasing a worse-off counterpart’s payoff at a personal 
cost also increases social welfare.  
 
In order to dig into these issues and obtain a more refined assessment of the values of α and β, 
we thus modified the social-preferences task of Bartling et al. (2009) by adding two decisions 
which were designed along the lines of the previous discussion. This modified task was 
implemented in Study 2. 
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Study 2 
Methods 
Participants and general protocol. Participants were 158 students (51.90% female; mean age 
21.52±2.63 (SD)) from the University Carlos III of Madrid in Spain. These participants were 
recruited from a database of more than 2,500 students. We conducted a total of eight sessions, 
three with 18 and 20 participants each and two with 22 participants. On average, sessions lasted 
for 60 minutes. As in Study 1, all subjects completed the same tasks in the same order and the 
social preferences elicitation task was performed before the CRT. In between the social 
preferences task and the CRT, participants completed a series of unrelated tasks for about 15 
minutes and had a break of 10 minutes. All participants in the experiments reported in this Study 
agreed to the Participation Rules and Privacy Policy when they registered to participate in 
experiments. Anonymity was always preserved (in agreement with Spanish Law 15/1999 on 
Personal Data Protection) by randomly assigning a numerical code to identify the participants in 
the system. No association was ever made between their real names and the results. As is 
standard in socio-economic experiments, no ethic concerns are involved other than preserving 
the anonymity of participants. No deception was used. This procedure was checked and 
approved by the department of Economics of the University Carlos III of Madrid; the institution 
hosting the experiments. At that time no official IRB was established at the university. 
 
Cognitive style assessment. As in Study 1, participants completed the extended version of the 
CRT developed by Toplak et al. (2014). In Table S2, we display the % of subjects answering 
each question correctly, split by gender. Again, males scored higher on the test than females. The 
full distribution of correct answers by males (mean = 3.22±1.73) and females (mean = 
2.18±1.35) is provided in Figure S2. The test was not incentivized.  
 
Social preferences elicitation. Participants made six choices between two possible allocations of 
money between themselves and another anonymous participant with whom they were randomly 
matched. Similarly to Study 1, in each experimental session, two participants and one of the six 
decisions were selected at random for payment. The choice of the first participant in the selected 
decision was used to allocate payoffs between the two participants. All decisions were 
anonymous. The first four decisions used the exact same payoffs as in Bartling et al. (2009). 
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Decisions 5 (advantageous domain) and 6 (disadvantageous domain) were designed for this 
particular experiment in such a way that the decision maker could increase the payoff of the 
other participant by €6 at a €2 cost. Thus, the cost for the decision-maker is low relative to the 
increase of the other’s payoff (i.e. a 1:3 cost-to-benefit ratio) so that giving also increases social 
welfare. The new task allows us to disentangle four subcategories of the “weak altruism” 
category of Study 1 (α ≤ 0, β ϵ [0, 0.5]) which was the most populated category and also the only 
one which was consistent with welfare concerns. In Study 2 and in contrast to Study 1, we could 
identify subjects exhibiting combinations of α and β that are consistent with social-welfare 
concerns but not with self-interest. We could thus distinguish between “weak” and “strong” 
preferences for social welfare. 
 
All the allocation decisions are described in Table 3. Option A always yielded an even 
distribution of money (€10 to both the self and the other participant) whereas option B yielded 
uneven payoffs. For each decision, we show in parentheses the envy/compassion parameter 
associated to choosing the egalitarian and non-egalitarian options (i.e. options A and B) and in 
square brackets the proportion of subjects who chose each option. Note that the model 
parameters associated to Decisions 1-4 are the same as in Study 1, except for the fact that in 
Decision 4 the threshold for the envy parameter is now 0.125 instead of 0.5. 
 
Decision # 
Option A 
self, other 
 Option B 
self, other 
 
1 €10,€10 (β ≥ 0) [86%] €10,€6 (β ≤ 0) [14%] 
2 €10,€10 (β ≥ 0.5) [27%] €16,€4 (β ≤ 0.5) [73%] 
3 €10,€10 (α ≥ 0) [42%] €10,€18 (α ≤ 0) [58%] 
4 €10,€10 (α ≥ 0.125) [30%] €11,€19 (α ≤ 0.125) [70%] 
5 €10,€10 (β ≥ 0.25) [42%] €12,€4 (β ≤ 0.25) [58%] 
6 €10,€10 (α ≥ -0.25) [84%] €8,€16 (α ≤ -0.25) [16%] 
Table 3. Decisions in the social preferences task (Study 2). For each option, we display the payoff 
for the decision-maker and the recipient, the associated model parameters (in parentheses) and the % 
of subjects choosing it (in square brackets). 
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Results and discussion 
Decision analysis 
Table 4 reports the results of a series of Probit regressions where the choice of option B in each 
decision is regressed as a function of CRT scores, controlling for gender. Robust standard errors 
clustered on individuals are presented in parentheses. In Figure S4, we display the proportion of 
subjects choosing option B in each decision, for individuals with below-median (i.e. two or less 
correct answers, n = 85) and above-median (n = 73) CRT scores. 
 
We find that CRT is negatively and (marginally) significantly related to choosing option B in 
Decision 1 (p = 0.09), indicating that individuals with higher CRT scores are less likely to 
display β ≤ 0, in line with the findings in Study 1. Also, the qualitative nature of our statistical 
results is robust to using a binary categorization of CRT instead of CRT scores. The effect of 
cognitive reflection on Decision 1 is actually more significant (p = 0.04, Table S4, column 1) 
when the binary categorization is used as explanatory variable. As in Study 1, a two-sided 
binomial test rejects the hypothesis that individuals are indifferent between the two options (for 
both below- and above-median CRT scores, the proportion of subjects choosing option B is well 
below 50%; ps < 0.01). That is, the majority of subjects, especially those with higher CRT 
scores, seem to display β > 0. 
 
In Decision 2, we observe some discrepancy with respect to Study 1 where CRT was not a 
significant predictor. In Study 2, CRT scores are positively and significantly related to choosing 
option B, indicating that higher CRT individuals are more likely to exhibit β ≤ 0.5. Yet, this 
relationship is only marginally significant (p = 0.09) and even turns insignificant when the binary 
categorization of CRT is used (p = 0.32, Table S4, column 2). As in Study 1, the proportion of 
subjects choosing option B in Decision 2 is higher than 50% in both CRT groups (two-sided 
binomial tests, ps < 0.01; see Figure S4). That is, the majority of subjects, especially those with 
higher CRT scores, seem to be characterized by β < 0.5. 
 
With regards to Decisions 3 and 4, the results are similar to those of Study 1. Specifically, CRT 
is positively and (marginally) significantly associated with the choice of option B in Decision 3 
(p = 0.07), implying α ≤ 0. This relationship turns significant at the 5% level when the binary 
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CRT variable is used (p = 0.03, Table S4, column 3). From Figure S4, we see that roughly 48% 
of below-median CRT subjects choose option B in Decision 3 (which is not significantly 
different from 50%, two-sided binomial test, p = 0.66, so we cannot reject that they are, on 
average, indifferent between both options: α = 0). In contrast, 68% of above-median CRT 
subjects choose option B (which is significantly different from 50%, p < 0.01). So, high-CRT 
subjects seem to display α < 0. In Decision 4, the choice of option B is positively and 
significantly predicted by CRT (p = 0.04; the binary CRT categorization yields p = 0.05, Table 
S4, column 4), implying that higher CRT subjects are more likely to display α ≤ 0.125. Indeed, 
about 79% of above-median CRT subjects choose option B in Decision 4 (Figure S4), which is 
significantly different from 50% (two-sided binomial test, p < 0.01), whereas 61% of below-
median CRT subjects did so (which is also significantly different from 50%, p = 0.05). Thus, α < 
0.125 seems to best characterize the majority of subjects, especially those with high CRT scores. 
 
 
Decision 1 Decision 2 Decision 3 Decision 4 Decision 5 Decision 6 
Dep var: β ≤ 0  β ≤ 0.5  α ≤ 0 α ≤ 0.125  β ≤ 0.25  α ≤ -0.25 
 
(vs ≥ 0) (vs ≥ 0.5) (vs ≥ 0) (vs ≥ 0.125) (vs ≥ 0.25) (vs ≥ -0.25) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CRT -0.149* 0.122* 0.124* 0.150** 0.109 -0.044 
 
(0.088) (0.073) (0.069) (0.072) (0.067) (0.084) 
female 0.306 0.070 -0.285 -0.462** 0.294 -0.146 
 
(0.276) (0.227) (0.213) (0.223) (0.216) (0.257) 
cons -0.898*** 0.252 0.017 0.390 -0.250 -0.812*** 
 
(0.334) (0.271) (0.262) (0.264) (0.260) (0.315) 
ll -60.929 -90.969 -103.938 -90.902 -105.927 -68.750 
Wald χ2 6.18** 2.89 6.86** 10.74*** 3.35 0.44 
pseudo R2 0.045 0.017 0.035 0.063 0.016 0.004 
Table 4. Non-egalitarian choice (option B) as a function of CRT (Study 2). Probit estimates. The α and β 
parameters associated with the dependent variable are displayed on top of each column. Robust standard 
errors clustered on individuals are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01 level, respectively. N = 158 in all regressions. 
 
In Decision 5, CRT does not yield a significant effect (p = 0.11; using the binary CRT variable, p 
= 0.39, Table S4, column 5). While 60% of above-median CRT subjects choose option B in 
Decision 5 (this proportion is marginally significantly different from 50%, two-sided binomial 
test, p = 0.10), this percentage shrinks to 55% for below-median CRT subjects (not significantly 
different from 50%, p = 0.38) (Figure S4). This indicates that most high-CRT subjects are 
characterized by β < 0.25, whereas the median β seems to be close to 0.25 for low-CRT subjects. 
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Finally, in Decision 6, where option B implies α ≤ -0.25, the coefficient associated to CRT is far 
from significant (p = 0.60; also using the binary CRT variable, p = 0.74, Table S4, column 6). 
About 16% of below-median CRT subjects and 15% of above-median CRT subjects choose 
option B in Decision 6 (both proportions are significantly different from 50%, two-sided 
binomial tests, ps < 0.01; see Figure S4), which implies that the majority of subjects is best 
characterized by α > -0.25, regardless of CRT scores. 
 
In sum, the previous analysis suggests that high-CRT individuals are best described by α ϵ (-
0.25, 0) and β ϵ (0, 0.25), whereas the distribution of the envy and compassion parameters of low 
CRT subjects is much more disperse.  
 
Social preferences categorization 
Now, we proceed by categorizing each individual according to their social preferences.  
 
Figure 3. Classification of subjects according to the envy and compassion parameters, by CRT groups (Study 
2). The figure displays the % of subjects that can be classified according to each combination of α and β and the 
social preferences which are consistent with each category, broken down into below-median (n = 68) and above-
median (n = 68) CRT score groups. 
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In Figure 3, we display the proportion of subjects that are characterized by each of the sixteen 
combinations of the envy and compassion parameters. We represent below-median CRT subjects 
on the left panel and above-median CRT subjects on the right panel. In our social preferences 
categorization, we excluded 22 subjects whose choices were inconsistent, so we ended up with 
136 observations (68 below-median and 68 above-median CRT subjects). No individuals were 
assigned to the following categories: “α ≤ -0.25, β ≤ 0” (strongly inequality seeking), “α ≤ -0.25, 
β ϵ [0, 0.25]” (strongly altruistic with social-welfare concerns) and “α ϵ [0, 0.125], β ϵ [0.25, 
0.5]” (strongly egalitarian).  
 
As expected, above-median CRT subjects are concentrated (35% of them) in the category “α ϵ [-
0.25, 0], β ϵ [0, 0.25]”, which again represents “weak altruism”, whereas below-median CRT 
subjects are more dispersed across categories, similarly to Study 1. The proportion of above-
median CRT subjects belonging to this category is significantly larger than the proportion of 
above-median CRT subjects belonging to any other category (two-sided Normal Proportion test, 
ps < 0.01). In the case of below-median CRT subjects a much lower proportion of people (15%) 
belong to the “α ≤ 0, β ϵ [0, 0.5]” category (p < 0.01). This category is still the most populated 
category among below-median CRT subjects but the proportion of below-median CRT subjects 
belonging to this category is only significantly larger than six out of the fifteen other categories. 
Note that, in contrast to Study 1 where there was only one category consistent with social-
welfare concerns, Study 2 allows us to identify different degrees of such concerns. The category 
defining the majority of above-median CRT subjects (“α ϵ [-0.25, 0], β ϵ [0, 0.25]”) corresponds 
to “weak” social-welfare concerns. 
 
In order to further explore these observations, we conducted a multinomial Probit regression, the 
results of which are presented in Figure 4. As for Study 1, CRT and gender are used as 
regressors. The most populated category, “α ϵ [-0.25, 0], β ϵ [0, 0.25]”, is used as the default 
category for the regression analysis. The numbers inside the remaining cells indicate the effect of 
CRT score on the likelihood that an individual is included in this specific category as compared 
to the default category. As expected, all estimates are negative indicating that subjects with 
higher CRT scores are more likely to belong to the default category “α ϵ [-0.25, 0], β ϵ [0, 0.25]” 
than to the remaining categories. The effect of CRT is statistically significant when comparing 
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the default category to the following ones: “α ϵ [-0.25, 0], β ≥ 0.5” (strongly altruistic, p = 0.02), 
“α ϵ [0, 0.125], β ≤ 0” (weakly spiteful, p < 0.01), “α ≥ 0.125, β ϵ [0.25, 0.5]” (strongly 
egalitarian, p < 0.01) and “α ≥ 0.125, β ≥ 0.5” (strongly egalitarian, p < 0.01). The effect of CRT 
is marginally significant with respect to “α ≥ 0.125, β ≤ 0” (strongly spiteful, p = 0.08) and “α ≥ 
0.125, β ϵ [0, 0.25]” (strongly egalitarian, p = 0.08) and close to significance with respect to “α ≤ 
-0.25, β ϵ [0.25, 0.5]” (strongly altruistic with social-welfare concerns, p = 0.13). The five 
remaining categories did not yield significant CRT effects (ps > 0.23). An interesting difference 
of Study 2 with respect to Study 1 is that two of the “strong altruism” categories show significant 
(or nearly significant) differences with the default group. This did not happen in Study 1, where 
there was only one such category (namely “α ≤ 0, β ≥ 0.5”) for which the associated coefficient 
was largely insignificant. Note that here the strongest difference is given by the comparison with 
the following category “α ≥ 0.125, β ϵ [0.25, 0.5]” (strongly egalitarian), which is the category 
higher CRT subjects are less likely to belong to. However, the coefficient associated to this 
category only differs significantly from the coefficient of the following categories: “α ϵ [-0.25, 
0], β ≤ 0” (weakly inequality seeking; note that only two subjects belong to this category), “α ϵ 
[0, 0.125], β ϵ [0, 0.25]” (weakly egalitarian) and “α ϵ [0, 0.125], β ≥ 0.5” (strongly egalitarian; 
only three subjects belong to this category) (ps < 0.05). The coefficient associated to the “α ≥ 
0.125, β ϵ [0.25, 0.5]” category marginally differs from the coefficients of the following 
categories: “α ≤ -0.25, β ≥ 0.5” (strongly altruistic) and “α ϵ [-0.25, 0], β ϵ [0.25, 0.5]” (strongly 
altruistic with social-welfare concerns) (ps = 0.08).  
 
Taken together, the results of Study 2 indicate that high cognitive reflection is characteristic of 
individuals who make choices consistent with mildly altruistic motives that increase social 
welfare at a very low cost. Low cognitive reflection is characteristic of individuals who make 
decisions consistent with either egalitarian or spiteful motives. These findings are consistent with 
Study 1. In slight contrast to Study 1, however, low-CRT people are also associated with strong 
altruistic motivations. It is important to note that, in Study 2, we were able to split the weak 
altruism/social-welfare preferences category into four subcategories. In contrast to Study 1, we 
could therefore isolate strong social-welfare concerns from weak social-welfare concerns and 
conclude that it is the latter which best characterizes individuals with high CRT scores. This 
methodological feature of Study 2 may thus have facilitated the observation of a difference in 
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terms of CRT scores between those subjects included in the default category and those classified 
as strongly altruistic. 
 
Figure 4. Output of multinomial Probit regression (Study 2). In each cell, the figure shows the coefficient of 
CRT obtained by comparing that specific social preference category with “α ϵ [-0.25, 0], β ϵ [0, 0.25]”. *, **, *** 
denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. Ll = -300.325, Wald χ2 = 50.17 (p < 0.01), N = 
136. Robust standard errors clustered on individuals are shown in parentheses, and the number of observations in 
square brackets. 
 
 
General discussion 
Cognitive reflection and social preferences: our insights 
In two studies, we showed that those individuals with a more reflective cognitive style (i.e. those 
who are less likely to rely on intuitive, System 1 processes) are more likely to make choices 
consistent with mildly altruistic motives in simple monetary decisions free of strategic and 
reciprocal concerns. These results suggest that behaviors that increase social welfare by 
increasing others’ payoffs at a very low or no cost for the individual may be the result of 
conscious deliberation rather than automatic heuristics. Behaviors driven by egalitarian or 
spiteful concerns, however, appear to be more intimately associated with intuition.6  
                                            
6 In a related strand of research on the psychological underpinnings of social behavior, Espín et al. (2012, 2013) 
have shown that those individuals who discount the future more heavily display more spite-based but not egalitarian 
behavior in economic games (namely in a dual-role ultimatum game and a social dilemma game with punishment). 
Since we find that lower CRT scores are related to both spitefulness and egalitarianism, our results thus support 
Espín et al.’s arguments that the social behaviors associated with short-run (vs. long-run) goals differ from those 
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While the above findings are robust across the two studies, we also find a slight but remarkable 
difference with respect to strongly altruistic choices that increase the other’s payoff at a 
relatively high cost to the individual. In Study 1 reflective subjects were quite likely to make 
such choices whereas in Study 2 they were not. Although methodological differences across 
studies (in Study 2 weak altruism was divided into four subcategories and strong altruism into 
two subcategories) may have facilitated the observation of this divergence, it might also have 
been influenced by cultural differences (Study 1 was conducted in the US while Study 2 was 
conducted in Spain). This difference may also be explained by the existence of ceiling effects as 
the average level of cognitive reflection, as measured by the number of correct answers to the 
CRT, was higher (25% higher, two-sided t-test: p < 0.01) in Study 1. Exploring these 
possibilities is an interesting avenue for future research. 
 
 Toward reconciliation: a unified view of the cognitive basis of social behavior 
The Social Heuristics Hypothesis 
At first sight, it might seem that more reflective individuals are guided by “weaker” social 
motivations as they are typically less likely to be classified in the categories representing strong 
social preferences. Accordingly, it may be tempting to interpret our findings as evidence that 
cognitive reflection goes along with self-interest in (non-strategic) one-shot social interactions. 
This would be, however, an incorrect interpretation of our findings because self-interest cannot 
explain why the most reflective individuals are overwhelmingly characterized as “mildly” 
altruistic while not being affected by other social preferences like spitefulness or egalitarianism. 
Therefore, it is not self-interest per se but a very particular mixture of self-interest and 
altruistic/social-welfare concerns that characterizes reflective individuals. In terms of the 
parameters of the generalized version of the Fehr-Schmidt’s (1999) model used here, high 
cognitive reflection is associated with a combination of slightly negative values of envy (α) and 
slightly positive values of compassion (β). Similar results have been obtained through structural 
estimation of the individuals’ envy and compassion parameters in Ponti & Rodríguez-Lara 
(2015). Moreover, there are much less individual differences in these parameters among 
                                                                                                                                            
associated with intuitive (vs. controlled) processes (even though temporal discounting is negatively correlated with 
CRT scores; see Frederick et al. 2005, Bosch-Domènech et al. 2014). 
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individuals with high CRT scores than among individuals with low CRT scores. While mean 
values of envy appear to be higher for individuals with a less reflective cognitive style, the 
relationship between CRT scores and compassion is more complex. Indeed, either high or very 
low (even negative) values of β can be associated with low cognitive reflection. Thus, we would 
not have been able to uncover some of the key differences between groups if we had focused on 
estimating mean values of the model parameters. 
 
From the viewpoint of the Social Heuristics Hypothesis (Rand et al. 2014b), our results suggest 
that behaviors driven by either egalitarianism or spitefulness (and possibly strong altruism) may 
be internalized as heuristics, which ultimately implies that they may be, on average, 
advantageous in daily-life interactions. Indeed, neurobiological research indicates that humans 
experience psychological satisfaction from observing equitable outcomes (Tricomi et al. 2010, 
Zaki & Mitchell 2011) but also from out-earning others (Fliessbach et al. 2007, Bault et al. 
2011), even if their own absolute payoff is unaffected. On the other hand, reflection should lead 
people to adapt their decision rules to the environment at hand (e.g. Kahneman 2011). Under this 
logic, the present results indicate that the most adaptive decisions in one-shot, non-strategic 
social interactions are those guided by mildly altruistic motives. 
 
These findings can shed light on the current debate regarding whether (pro)social behavior is 
automatic or deliberate (Rand & Nowak 2013, Zaki & Mitchel 2013). Previous research has led 
to ostensibly contradictory results which have partly been accounted for by the existence of 
moderator variables (e.g. subjects’ prior experience in economic experiments; Cone & Rand 
2014, Rand et al. 2014a, 2014b) and confounding factors (linked, for example, to the use of 
reaction times to infer the effect of reflection on behavior; Evans et al. 2014, Recalde et al. 
2014). Yet, our findings reveal that another non-negligible portion of these apparently conflicting 
findings can be reconciled by accounting for two often-ignored factors. First, different motives 
can lead to identical choices in the experimental set-ups normally used to infer the nature of 
social behavior (Charness & Rabin 2002). Second, by putting the focus almost exclusively on the 
conflict between prosociality and self-interest, previous research has tended to overlook 
antisocial motivations that can trigger behaviors which may appear as selfish or even prosocial 
(e.g. Espín et al. 2012, Brañas-Garza et al. 2014). 
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Revisiting previous findings in standard economic games 
We start by considering the standard dictator game, where the decision maker has to split a sum 
of money between herself and a passive recipient (Forsythe et al. 1994). Since giving in the 
dictator game is typically the result of either strongly egalitarian or strongly altruistic motives, 
our findings suggest that it should be an intuitive decision (Cornelissen et al. 2011, Ruff et al. 
2013, Cappelen et al. 2014). However, since giving nothing can be the result not only of self-
interest but also of spitefulness, it may also respond to intuition (Martinsson et al. 2012, Xu et al. 
2012, Achtziger et al. 2015). The exact proportion of these different motives in a specific 
population would thus dramatically influence whether intuitive decision making is linked to 
more or less generosity in the dictator game. 
 
The ultimatum game (Güth et al. 1982) is identical to the dictator game except for the fact that 
the second player (the responder) can either accept or reject the proposed distribution of money. 
If she accepts, the proposal is implemented accordingly; in case of rejection, both players earn 
nothing. The behavior of the first player (the proposer) is strongly influenced by strategic 
concerns (avoidance of rejection) so the intrinsic motivations behind proposers’ behavior are 
difficult to uncover (e.g. Prasnikar & Roth 1992). By contrast, responders’ behavior is not 
shaped by strategic concerns and the decision to reject a low offer has been primarily 
rationalized as the result of the individual’s aversion to unequal outcomes (Fehr & Schmidt 
1999). In this vein, the responder’s decisions are often interpreted as a conflict between the 
money-maximizing strategy of accepting an unfair but positive offer and the egalitarian, 
prosocial preference to reject it. Recent research has shown, however, that altruistic, prosocial 
motives can also lead to acceptance (Staffiero et al. 2013) and that spiteful, antisocial motives 
can also lead to rejection (Brañas-Garza et al. 2014). According to these observations, our results 
suggest that rejections should be driven by intuition (whether they are guided by egalitarian or 
spiteful motivations) whereas acceptance should be driven by reflection in most (mild altruism), 
but not all (strong altruism) cases. The fact that rejection [acceptance] is guided by intuitive 
[deliberative] processes is consistent with the majority of previous findings (e.g. Sutter et al. 
2003, Tabibnia et al. 2008, Grimm & Mengel 2011), although there exist some challenging 
neurobiological evidence (Knoch et al. 2006, 2010). 
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With regards to social dilemma games, our results suggest that cooperation can be the result of 
conscious deliberation (e.g. Lohse et al. 2014, Martinsson et al. 2014) if it follows from mildly 
altruistic motives but can also be intuitive (e.g. Rand et al. 2012, Nielsen et al. 2014) when it is 
guided either by a desire to equalize payoffs with expectedly cooperative partners or by a 
strongly altruistic desire to unconditionally increase others’ payoffs. Likewise, defection can be 
driven by reflection if the cost of increasing others’ payoffs is sufficiently high so that only 
highly altruistic but not mildly altruistic individuals are willing to cooperate but can also be 
driven by intuition if it is the result of spiteful or egalitarian (i.e. to equalize payoffs with 
expectedly uncooperative partners) motives. Whether cooperation is (statistically) an intuitive or 
reflective decision in social dilemma experiments could thus depend on the distribution of social 
motives in the sample under scrutiny. 
 
In sum, our findings highlight that the analysis of the cognitive basis of social behavior is likely 
to be more complex than previously thought. It must also be said, however, that strategic issues 
and reciprocity (which were voluntarily absent of our study) may play an essential role in social 
dilemma and ultimatum games (e.g. Charness & Rabin 2002, Falk & Fischbacher 2006, Fehr & 
Schmidt 2006), blurring further the analysis of the cognitive basis of social behavior.  
 
Finally, our results are based on a trait approach to cognitive reflection and it would thus be 
important for future research to assess the robustness of these findings to experimental 
manipulations of intuitive processing. Identifying the neurobiological underpinnings of these 
individual differences in trait reflectiveness and their relationship to social preferences appears as 
a necessary next step towards achieving a more complete understanding of the cognitive basis of 
human social behavior (Nash et al. 2015). 
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Figure S1. Distribution of CRT scores by gender (Study 1) 
 
  
 
Figure S2. Distribution of CRT scores by gender (Study 2)  
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Figure S3. Percentage of subjects choosing option B in each decision, by CRT groups 
(Study 1). The model parameters associated to option B are shown in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Figure S4. Percentage of subjects choosing option B in each decision, by CRT groups 
(Study 2). The model parameters associated to option B are shown in parentheses. 
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Text S1. Cognitive Reflection Test 
 
Taken from Frederick (2005): 
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? 
____ cents 
[Correct answer: 5 cents; intuitive answer: 10 cents] 
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 
widgets? ____ minutes 
[Correct answer: 5 minutes; intuitive answer: 100 minutes] 
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to 
cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? ____ days 
[Correct answer: 47 days; intuitive answer: 24 days] 
Taken form Toplack et al. (2014):  
(4) If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one barrel of water in 12 days, how long 
would it take them to drink one barrel of water together? _____ days  
[correct answer: 4 days; intuitive answer: 9] 
(5) Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How many students are in the 
class? ______ students  
[correct answer: 29 students; intuitive answer: 30]  
(6) A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80, and sells it finally for $90. How much has he 
made? _____ dollars 
[correct answer: $20; intuitive answer: $10]  
(7) Simon decided to invest $8,000 in the stock market one day early in 2008. Six months after he invested, on 
July 17, the stocks he had purchased were down 50%. Fortunately for Simon, from July 17 to October 17, the 
stocks he had purchased went up 75%. At this point, Simon has: a. broken even in the stock market, b. is 
ahead of where he began, c. has lost money 
[correct answer: c; intuitive response: b] 
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CRT question Males (%) Females (%) p-value 
1 56.63 34.33 <0.01 
2 44.58 28.36 0.04 
3 60.24 35.82 <0.01 
4 49.40 32.84 0.05 
5 42.17 19.40 <0.01 
6 48.19 38.81 0.32 
7 66.27 49.25 0.04 
Table S1. Percentage of subjects answering correctly the CRT by question and gender (Study 1). 
P-values from two-sided Fisher’s exact tests for the (gender) difference in proportions. 
 
 
CRT question Males (%) Females (%) p-value 
1 47.37 31.71 0.05 
2 38.16 18.29 <0.01 
3 43.42 17.07 <0.01 
4 47.37 24.39 <0.01 
5 42.11 25.61 0.03 
6 72.37 47.56 <0.01 
7 31.58 53.66 <0.01 
Table S2. Percentage of subjects answering correctly the CRT by question and gender (Study 2). 
P-values from two-sided Fisher’s exact tests for the (gender) difference in proportions. 
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Decision 1 Decision 2 Decision 3 Decision 4 
Dep var: β ≤ 0 (vs ≥ 0) β ≤ 0.5 (vs ≥ 0.5) α ≤ 0 (vs ≥ 0) α ≤ 0.5 (vs ≥ 0.5) 
High CRT -0.361 -0.226 0.975*** 0.669*** 
 
(0.290) (0.236) (0.231) (0.238) 
female -0.512* -0.316 -0.266 -0.313 
 
(0.293) (0.235) (0.223) (0.228) 
cons -0.736*** 0.998*** -0.059 0.383** 
 
(0.219) (0.204) (0.184) (0.190) 
ll -58.527 -79.235 -90.056 -86.866 
Wald χ2 3.40 2.27 22.40*** 12.40*** 
pseudo R2 0.037 0.013 0.118 0.069 
Table S3. Non-egalitarian choice (option B) as a function of CRT and Raven (Study 1). Probit 
estimates. High CRT is a dummy that takes value 1 if the CRT score is above the median and takes 
value 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered on individuals are shown in parentheses. *, **, 
*** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. N = 150 in all regressions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision 1 Decision 2 Decision 3 Decision 4 Decision 5 Decision 6 
Dep var: β ≤ 0  β ≤ 0.5  α ≤ 0 α ≤ 0.125  β ≤ 0.25  α ≤ -0.25 
 
(vs ≥ 0) (vs ≥ 0.5) (vs ≥ 0) (vs ≥ 0.125) (vs ≥ 0.25) (vs ≥ -0.25) 
High CRT -0.585** 0.221 0.460** 0.417* 0.178 -0.082 
 
(0.281) (0.222) (0.209) (0.217) (0.208) (0.254) 
female 0.318 -0.003 -0.310 -0.504** 0.220 -0.118 
 
(0.270) (0.221) (0.209) (0.216) (0.208) (0.252) 
cons -1.049*** 0.510** 0.149 0.614*** -0.004 -0.905*** 
 
(0.241) (0.199) (0.189) (0.189) (0.188) (0.229) 
ll -60.046 -91.959 -103.249 -91.269 -106.920 -68.856 
Wald χ2 7.11** 4.05 8.49** 9.48*** 1.52 0.25 
pseudo R2 0.058 0.006 0.041 0.059 0.007 0.002 
Table S4. Non-egalitarian choice (option B) as a function of CRT (Study 2). Probit estimates. High CRT 
is a dummy that takes value 1 if the CRT score is above the median and takes value 0 otherwise.  Robust 
standard errors clustered on individuals are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 
0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. N = 158 in all regressions. 
 
 
